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 United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017) 
 
Summer L. Carmack 
  
The Osage Nation, as owner of the beneficial interest in its mineral 
estate, issues federally-approved leases to persons and entities who wish 
to conduct mineral development on its lands. After an energy-development 
company, Osage Wind, leased privately-owned surface lands within Tribal 
reservation boundaries and began to excavate minerals for purposes of 
constructing a wind farm, the United States brought suit on the Tribe’s 
behalf. In the ensuing litigation, the Osage Nation insisted that Osage 
Wind should have obtained a mineral lease from the Tribe before 
beginning its work. In its decision, the Tenth Circuit applied one of the 
Indian law canons of construction and concluded that the digging, 
crushing, and sorting of minerals by Osage Wind amounted to “mineral 
development” under the definition of “mining,” and therefore required a 
mineral lease issued by the Osage Mineral Council. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, the Osage Mineral Council 
(“OMC”), acting on behalf  of the Osage Nation, appealed the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma’s grant of 
summary judgment to Osage Wind, LLC (“Osage Wind”).1 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit  reviewed two threshold 
issues and one merits issue: (1) whether OMC may appeal the summary 
judgment decision if it was not “formally a party to the lawsuit when it 
appealed” because the United States acted on its behalf in the underlying 
proceedings;2 (2) whether, under the doctrine of res judicata, Osage Wind 
met its burden of proving that OMC’s claim should be precluded because 
it could have been raised in an earlier lawsuit between the parties;3 and (3) 
whether Osage Wind’s excavation activities constituted “mineral 
development” within a federal regulation definition of “mining,” and 
therefore required a federally-approved, tribally-issued lease from OMC.4  
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the summary judgment 
ruling, holding that OMC had the right to appeal the judgment because of 
its “‘unique interest’ in the subject matter of the case,” and that the claim 
was not barred by res judicata.5 The Court also concluded that summary 
judgment was improper because the excavation work of Osage Wind 
qualified as “mining” and required a lease through OMC.6
                                                     
1. United States v. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir. 2017). 
2. Id. at 1084.  
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1087. 
6. Id. at 1092. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Historical Context 
 
In 1872, Congress reserved lands for the Osage Nation in 
Oklahoma.7 The Osage Act, enacted in 1906, began allotment of those 
previously-reserved, tribally-held lands.8 The surface estate of the lands 
was severed from the mineral estate and divided into separate allotments 
for individual tribal members.9 The mineral estate was “reserved for the 
benefit of the Osage Nation,” with the United States acting as legal 
trustee.10 The Osage Act provides that the Osage Nation may “issue leases 
for ‘all oil, gas, and other minerals.’”11 The leases issued by the Osage 
Nation must be approved by the Department of the Interior.12 OMC 
supervises the mineral estate and leasing on behalf of the Osage Nation.13  
 
B. Prior Litigation 
 
Osage Wind leased the surface rights of private fee-land within 
the Tribe’s reservation boundaries in 2010 for purposes of constructing a 
commercial wind farm.14 OMC and Osage Wind were first involved in 
litigation in 2011, when OMC filed suit against Osage Wind alleging 
construction of the wind farm on the leased surface estate would block 
OMC’s oil-and-gas lessees from the mineral estate.15 OMC cited a federal 
regulation which “entitles OMC’s oil-and-gas lessees to reasonable use of 
the surface land to support their underground oil-and-gas operations[,]” 
but its claim failed when OMC failed to show that its oil-and-gas lessees’ 
activities and Osage Wind’s construction would conflict.16 
 
C. Current Litigation 
 
Osage Wind proceeded with its project, and in late 2014 began 
excavation to construct platforms for its wind turbines.17 Each turbine 
structure required the support of a “cement foundation measuring 10 feet 
deep and up to 60 feet in diameter.”18 Osage Wind created the holes for 
                                                     
7. Id. at 1082 (citing Act of June 5, 1872, Ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228). 
8. Id. (citing Act of June 28, 1906, Ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539, § 2 
[hereinafter Osage Act]).  
9. Id. (citing Osage Act, §§ 2-3). 
10. Id. (citing Osage Act, § 3; see, e.g., Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 
1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
11. Id. (citing Osage Act, § 3). 
12. Id. (citing Osage Act, § 3). 
13. Id. at 1082-83. 
14. Id. at 1083. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 226.19 (2014)). 
17. Id. 
18. Id.  
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these foundations by removing “soil, sand, and rock of varying sizes.”19 
“Rock pieces smaller than 3 feet were crushed into even smaller sizes and 
then, after each foundation was poured and cured, the crushed rocks were 
pushed back over the hole and compacted into the excavated site.”20 
The United States, as trustee of Osage Nation’s mineral estate, 
filed suit shortly after the excavation work began, seeking an injunction 
order against Osage Wind.21 In its injunction request, the United States 
alleged that Osage Wind’s excavation activities constituted “mining” and 
required a federally-approved mineral lease.22 Upon completion of the 
excavation, the United States withdrew its injunction request and sued 
Osage Wind for damages for failure to obtain a mineral lease.23 The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Osage Wind after narrowly 
interpreting 25 C.F.R. § 211.324 as applicable only to mineral development 
conducted for commercial purposes.25  
The United States had sixty days to file an appeal after summary 
judgment was awarded.26 During this time, OMC repeatedly inquired into 
the United States’ intention to appeal the judgment, and did not receive an 
answer until the “final day of the appeal deadline.”27 After it learned the 
United States did not plan to file an appeal, OMC “scrambled” and filed a 
motion to intervene as a matter of right and a notice of appeal of the 
summary judgment decision.28 The two motions were filed within minutes 
of one another; however, the district court denied OMC’s motion to 
intervene, citing a “lack of jurisdiction due to the pending [merits] 
appeal.”29 OMC then appealed the district court’s decision denying its 
motion to intervene.30  
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Tenth Circuit first resolved whether OMC had the right to 
appeal, even though it was not party to the suit, and whether the res 
                                                     
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.3, 214.7). 
23. Id. at 1083-84. 
24. 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 defines “mining” as “the science, technique, and 
business of mineral development including, but not limited to: opencast work, 
underground work, and in-situ leaching directed to severance and treatment of 
minerals; Provided, when sand, gravel, pumice, cinders, granite, building stone, 
limestone, clay or silt is the subject mineral, an enterprise is considered “mining” 
only if the extraction of such a mineral exceeds 5,000 cubic yards in any given year.” 
25. Osage Wind, 871 F.3d at 1089. 
26. Id. at 1084. 
27. Id. (emphasis in original). 
28. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV P. 24(a)). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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judicata doctrine barred OMC’s suit.31 After settling those threshold 
issues, the Court determined whether the district court’s summary 
judgment decision and its interpretation of applicable mining statutes was 
proper.32 
 
A. Osage Mineral Council’s Right to Appeal 
 
The Tenth Circuit recognized OMC was not a party to the suit 
when it appealed the district court’s summary judgment decision.33 
Because of the short time frame between filings, the district court did not 
have time to rule on OMC’s motion to intervene prior to its filing of the 
appeal notice.34 Generally only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly 
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment.35 However, OMC fell 
within a narrow exception that applies to “would-be appellants that have a 
sufficiently ‘unique interest’ in the subject matter of the case.”36 The Court 
ruled OMC possessed the right to appeal because its unique interests were 
substantial, and to hold otherwise would “effectively force[] OMC to 
watch from the sidelines as Osage Wind disrupted the mineral estate, 
which is owned by OMC’s tribe.”37 
Even though OMC did not attempt to intervene until the last 
moment, it “d[id] not foreclose application of the unique-interest 
exception” because OMC’s interests were represented by the United States 
up until the moment OMC filed for intervention.38 Had OMC motioned to 
intervene before the United States indicated it did not plan to appeal the 
district court’s ruling, OMC’s motion “would have been denied” because 
its “interests [were] protected by an existing party.”39 The Court stressed 
the narrowness of the unique-interest exception, and reiterated that the 
                                                     
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33.  Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
36. Id. (citing Plain v. Murphy Family Farms, 296 F.3d 975, 979 (10th 
Cir. 2002)). 
37. Id. at 1084-85 (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) 
(allowing nonnamed class members to appeal a settlement hearing, even though the 
nonnamed members had not first filed a motion to intervene); Plain, 296 F.3d at 979-
80 (allowing a decedent’s children to appeal, where a district court twice denied 
motions to intervene by a decedent’s children in a wrongful-death lawsuit, stating that 
the children’s interests was sufficiently unique)). The Court also distinguished OMC’s 
claims from its holding in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Kempthorne, 525 
P.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2008), because OMC possessed a “sole beneficial interest” in the 
property at issue, rather than a shared interest as in Kempthorne. Id. at 1085-86 
(citation omitted). Further, the fact that OMC’s right to issue leases was an 
individualized right, rather than a public right distinguished the present facts from 
those in Kempthorne. Id at 1086. 
38. Id. at 1085 (See Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
619 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
39. Id. (quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 619 F.3d at 1232; see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)). 
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“interested person must have a particularized and significant stake in the 
appeal, and must further demonstrate cause for why [they] did not or could 
not intervene in the proceedings below.”40 The Tenth Circuit then 
dismissed as moot OMC’s appeal of the district court ruling denying 
intervention.41 
 
B. Claim Preclusion under the Doctrine of Res Judicata 
 
Osage Wind contended that OMC’s claims concerning mineral 
leases should be barred because it did not assert those claims in its 2011 
litigation.42 “Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on 
the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the prior 
action.”43 The party asserting a res judicata defense has the burden of 
proving the opposing party could have asserted its claim in prior 
litigation.44 The Court held that Osage Wind did not meet the requisite 
burden of proof, because OMC’s present claim would not have been ripe 
during the 2011 lawsuit, as “the magnitude of the planned excavation work 
was not known to OMC or the United States” at that time.45 
 
C. Excavation Work as “Mining” 
  
The Court next turned to whether Osage Wind’s excavation 
activities constituted mining and thus required a mining lease.46 In its 
decision, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged and applied an Indian law canon 
of construction and referenced the “long-established principle that 
ambiguity in laws designed to favor the Indians ought ‘to be liberally 
construed’ in the Indians’ favor.”47 Because the regulations at issue 
“[were] designed to protect Indian mineral resources and ‘maximize 
[Indians]’ best economic interests,’” they were interpreted in a manner 
favoring OMC as the representative of the Osage Nation.48  
The pertinent regulation in this case, 25 C.F.R. pt. 211, deals with 
Indian mineral resources generally, and “applies broadly to all Indian 
lands.”49 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 provides that “[m]ining means the science, 
technique, and business of mineral development[.]”50 However, the 
                                                     
40. Id. at 1086 (emphasis added). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1086-87 (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Comm., Inc., 7 F.3d 
1464, 1467-68 (10th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in original). 
44. Id. at 1087 (citing Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rest., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 
(10th Cir. 1997)). 
45. Id. at 1087. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1090. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1082, 1088. 
50. Id. at 1089. (emphasis in original). 
6 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
regulation mentions an exception to the mining definition if the extracted 
minerals are common, so long as the excavation of the common minerals 
does not “exceed[] 5,000 cubic yards in any given year.”51 The minerals 
extracted during Osage Wind’s project were common to the area, but the 
volume of common-variety minerals extracted were measured by the total 
amount removed from each hole created, and far exceeded the 5,000 cubic 
yards mentioned in the regulation exception.52 
Osage Wind ineffectively argued that “mineral development” 
referred only to commercialization of the extractions, pointing to the 
Osage Act and other regulations concerning commercialized minerals.53 
The Court thought this interpretation “overly restrictive,” and instead held 
the term “mineral development” to have a “broad meaning.”54 Interpreting 
the regulation in a light most favorable to the Tribe, the Court concluded 
that while the ambiguous term “mineral development” certainly includes 
commercialization and other traditional mining activities, “it also 
encompasses action upon the extracted minerals for the purposes of 
exploiting the minerals themselves on site.”55 The Court was clear to 
distinguish “merely encountering or disrupting” minerals from the 
“exploitation” of minerals, stating that the former was not enough to 
qualify as mining under § 211.3.56 By removing the minerals from the 
ground, sorting the rocks by size, crushing the larger rocks into smaller 
bits, and using the crushed fragments to support the foundations of its wind 
turbines, Osage Wind’s actions effectively exploited the minerals and 
constituted “mineral development.”57 For this reason, the Court held 
summary judgment in favor of Osage Wind improper because a federally-
approved lease from OMC was required under 25 C.F.R. § 214.7.58  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This case is important because of the broad interpretation used by 
the Court in defining the scope of regulated mining activities as it pertains 
to tribal mineral estates. The Court’s ruling serves as an example of a 
Court effectively applying one of the Indian law canons of construction. 
By interpreting the regulations at issue in a manner favorable to the Osage 
Nation, the Court recognized the Osage Nation’s assertion of inherent 
sovereignty by requiring persons and entities to comport with its leasing 
requirements. Although it could be argued that the Court’s ruling 
discourages the productive use of property by companies seeking to work 
on privately-owned lands, it also reinforces the importance of proper 
                                                     
51. Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2014)). 
52. Id. at n. 9. 
53. Id. at 1090. 
54. Id. at 1091. 
55. Id. at 1081, 1091-92. 
56. Id. at 1092. 
57. Id. at 1091-92. 
58. Id. at 1092. 
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consultation with tribes before working within reservation boundaries. 
